Interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model

This paper deals with the prevailing formal model for knowledge in contemporary economics, namely the state-space model introduced by Robert Aumann in 1976. In particular, the paper addresses the following question arising in this formalism: in order to state that an event is interactively or commonly known among a group of agents, do we need to assume that each of them knows how the information is imparted to the others? Aumann answered in the negative, but his arguments apply only to canonical, i.e., completely specified state spaces, while in most applications the state space is not canonical. This paper addresses the same question along original lines, demonstrating that the answer is negative for both canonical and not-canonical state spaces. Further, it shows that this result ensues from two counterintuitive properties held by knowledge in the state-space model, namely Substitutivity and Monotonicity.

Early Experiments in Consumer Demand Theory: 1930-1970

This paper reconstructs the history of experimental research on consumer demand behavior between 1930 and 1970. The backgrounds of the experiments and their impact on the development of consumption theory are also investigated. Among other things, the paper shows that in fact many prominent economists of the period were involved in this stream of research.

W.E. Johnson’s 1913 Paper and the Question of His Knowledge of Pareto

In 1913, the Cambridge logician W.E. Johnson published a famous article on demand theory in the Economic Journal. Although Johnson’s treatment of the subject strongly resembles the analysis set forth by Pareto in the Manual of Political Economy, Johnson does not cite the Italian economist. This has aroused a long-standing debate about Johnson’s actual acquaintance with Pareto’s works, but the debated point has never been thoroughly investigated. The present paper addresses the question of Johnson’s knowledgeof Pareto both from an analytical and historical viewpoint, by examining Johnson’s life in the Cambridge environment and his available unpublished papers. Even though the new evidence gathered gives some weight to the thesis that Johnson could not have been unaware of Pareto’s Manual, it cannot exclude the possibility that the logician wrote his paper autonomously.Johnson, Pareto, Cambridge School, Consumer Theory, Complementarity

History of consumer demand theory 1871-1971: A Neo-Kantian rational reconstruction

This paper examines the history of the neoclassical theory of consumer demand from 1871 to 1971 by bringing into play the knowledge theory of the Marburg School, a Neo-Kantian philosophical movement. The work aims to show the usefulness of a Marburg-inspired epistemology in rationalizing the development of consumer analysis and, more generally, to understand the principles that regulate the process of knowing in neoclassical economics.Consumer Theory, Demand Theory, Utility Theory, Neo- Kantianism, Marburg School

Becker random behavior and the as-if defense of rational choice theory in demand analysis

In discussing rational choice theory (RCT) as an explanation of demand behavior, Becker (1962, Journal of Political Economy, 70, 1–13) proposed a model of random choice in which consumers pick a bundle on their budget line according to a uniform distribution. This model has then been used in various ways to assess the validity of RCT and to support as-if arguments in defense of it. This paper makes both historical and methodological contributions. Historically, it investigates how the interpretation of Becker random behavior evolved between the original 1962 article and the modern experimental literature on individual demand, and surveys six experiments in which it has been used as an alternative hypothesis to RCT. Methodologically, this paper conducts an assessment of the as-if defense of RCT from the standpoint of Becker’s model. It argues that this defense is ‘weak’ in a number of senses, and that it has negatively influenced the design of experiments about RCT

Epistemic virtues and theory choice in economics

When economists have to choose between competing theories, they evaluate not only the theories’ empirical relevance, but also qualities like their simplicity, tractability, parsimony and unifying power. These are called the epistemic virtues of a theory. The present paper proposes a formal definition for some epistemic virtues and investigates their role for theory choice in economics

On the recent philosophy of decision theory

In the philosophy of economics, the last fifteen years have witnessed an intense discussion about the epistemological status of economic models of decision making and their theoretical components, such as the concept of preference. In this article I offer a selective review of this discussion and indicate the directions in which I believe it should evolve

A review of nudges: definitions, justifications, effectiveness

In 2008, the behavioral economist Richard Thaler and the legal scholar Cass Sunstein published a book in which they advocated a novel approach to public policy based on the notion of a “nudge.” Roughly speaking, a nudge is an intervention in the decisional context that steers people's decisions by acting on their cognitive biases. The notion of a nudge generated an intense debate across different disciplines and proved popular with many policy makers around the world. The present article reviews the debate and research on nudges by focusing on three main dimensions: (1) the exact definition of nudges; (2) the justification of nudge policies, with a focus on “libertarian paternalism”; and (3) the effectiveness of nudges, both over time and in comparison with standard policies

Daniel M. Hausman's Preference, value, choice, and welfare. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 168 pp.

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Addendum to "Impact of polarization observables and Bc→τνB_c\to \tau \nu on new physics explanations of the b→cτνb\to c \tau \nu anomaly"

In this addendum to arXiv:1811.09603 we update our results including the recent measurement of ${\cal R}(D)$ and ${\cal R}(D^*)$ by the Belle collaboration: ${\cal R}(D)_{\rm Belle} = 0.307\pm0.037\pm0.016$ and ${\cal R}(D^*)_{\rm Belle}=0.283\pm0.018\pm0.014$, resulting in the new HFLAV fit result ${\cal R}(D) = {0.340\pm0.027 \pm 0.013}$, ${\cal R}(D^*) = {0.295\pm0.011 \pm 0.008 }$, exhibiting a $3.1\,\sigma$ tension with the Standard Model. We present the new fit results and update all figures, including the relevant new collider constraints. The updated prediction for ${\cal R}(\Lambda_c)$ from our sum rule reads ${\cal R}(\Lambda_c)= \mathcal{R}_{\rm SM}(\Lambda_c) \left( 1.15 \pm 0.04 \right) = 0.38 \pm 0.01 \pm 0.01$. We also comment on theoretical predictions for the fragmentation function $f_c$ of $b\to B_c$ and their implication on the constraint from $B_{u/c}\to\tau\nu$ data.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures. v2: references added, matches PRD versio